Elections in Bulgaria: Will Radev Become the New Orbán for Ukraine?

On April 19, 2026, Rumen Radev’s “Progressive Bulgaria” party won 1,444,920 votes, 44.59%, and 131 seats in the 240-member National Assembly. This gave the former president a single-party government mandate, something Bulgaria hasn’t seen in nearly three decades.

For Ukraine, this news is alarming not only because of Radev’s longstanding rhetoric regarding Russia. The issue is broader: is a new player emerging in the EU and NATO capable of replacing Viktor Orbán’s role in blocking decisions on war, sanctions, and European security? The answer is more complex than a catchy label: the risk exists, but a mechanical analogy with Budapest does not hold.

In brief

• Radev secured an absolute parliamentary majority, but not a majority sufficient for constitutional restructuring of the system.
• “Revival” barely cleared the electoral threshold to enter parliament and no longer appears to be an independent hub for pro-Russian mobilization.
• Radev’s victory was the result not only of geopolitics, but primarily of a protracted government crisis, corruption fatigue, and social discontent.
• For Kyiv, the main risk lies not in Sofia’s immediate break with the EU or NATO, but in the concentration of power, ambiguous rhetoric, and the weakness of the opposition.
• The Bulgarian defense sector, tied to Ukrainian demand and the European market, is holding back a sharp anti-Ukrainian shift.

The official election results are clear-cut. Only five parties made it into parliament: “GERB–SDS” (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria–Union of Democratic Forces, in Bulgarian: ГЕРБ-Съюзът на демократичните сили) — 433,755 votes and 39 seats, “We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria” (in Bulgarian: PP–DB — KOALICIYA PRODOLZHAVAME PROMYANATA – DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA) — 408,846 and 37, “DPS” (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, in Bulgarian: ДВИЖЕНИЕ ЗА ПРАВА И СВОБОДИ) — 230,693 and 21, “Revival” (in Bulgarian: ВЪЗРАЖДАНЕ) — 137,940 and 12%, and “Progressive Bulgaria” (in Bulgarian: ПРОГРЕСИВНА БЪЛГАРИЯ) — 1,444,920 and 131%. The Central Election Commission set the 4% threshold at 129,606.24 votes. In effect, this means that “Revival” retained its seats in parliament by a margin of less than 8,400 votes.

The key point here is not even the magnitude of the victory, but the fact that Bulgaria has moved away from the model of a fragmented parliament. After a series of short-lived cabinets, crisis coalitions, and snap campaigns, Sofia is getting a single-party government for the first time in a long while. But 131 MPs is the threshold for governmental stability, not a carte blanche to rewrite state rules. That is precisely why Radev’s victory simultaneously reassures a segment of Bulgarian society weary of chaos and alarms those who see the risk of excessive concentration of power.

It is also symbolic that nearly the entire old political class has been forced onto the defensive. Boyko Borisov’s party retained its seats in parliament but lost its monopoly on the role of the government’s chief right-wing manager. The PP–DB remained significant but did not become an alternative center of gravity. And the radically pro-Russian “Revival” party has formally survived, but no longer dictates the agenda. This is an important shift for the entire regional discourse: the pro-Russian electorate in Bulgaria has not disappeared, but is no longer tied solely to a single openly Kremlin-aligned niche.

These elections were a vote not so much for ideological purity as against the old political machine. Bulgaria entered the election cycle exhausted: short-lived governments, shaky coalitions, premature campaigns, corruption scandals, street protests, and the sense that for years the political class has offered neither reforms nor basic governance. Radev entered this moment not as a newcomer, but as the country’s most recognizable politician, who had long stood above party strife while simultaneously controlling the logic of government offices.

Piotr Pietrzak, Ph.D., a researcher in international relations theory, just war theory, geopolitics, geoeconomics, and political philosophy, affiliated with the Vistula Academy of Finance and Business and the In Statu Nascendi Think Tank, puts it bluntly: Radev won “not because he is pro-Russian,” but because for a significant portion of voters, the only alternative was the old, discredited forces. This assessment captures what is often lost in the Western and Ukrainian media noise: voters in Bulgaria voted for a way out of the crisis, not for a change in the state’s civilizational affiliation.

Petshak also draws attention to the social dimension of this campaign. For many Bulgarians, the debate over the euro, inflation, and the cost of living resonated more deeply than grand discussions about geopolitics. By this logic, Radev appeared not as a Kremlin ideologue, but as a pragmatist promising to reduce political chaos, rein in corrupt networks, and restore the state’s ability to make decisions.

Darin Drossev, Ph.D. and president of the Institute for Integration Studies, highlights another aspect of this victory. According to him, the prolonged political crisis allowed Radev to build influence through three interim governments, and his current success rests not only on an electoral wave but also on a close circle of associates cultivated over the years. This is important because it explains why his movement so easily became the main center of gravity for very different groups—from pro-European voters disillusioned with the old elites to a segment of the pro-Russian electorate.

Bulgaria’s New Wave: Radev’s Victory, the Orbán Myth, and the Battle for Effective Opposition

“We have a radically different wave,” says Drossev. But he also sees a weakness in this wave: Radev’s parliamentary faction is large, yet lacks sufficient legislative experience and may end up dependent on a narrow circle of people who will make decisions outside of any real internal debate. This is precisely where the line between stabilization and risk lies. Radev has indeed given Bulgaria a vertical decision-making structure where there was previously paralysis. But this very structure could quickly turn into a temptation to confine power within a tight circle of people without proper political balance.

Comparing Radev to Orbán makes political sense: both speak the language of national interest, criticize parts of the Brussels agenda, and try to capitalize on public fatigue from war and economic pressure. But the similarities end there. First, Radev does not have a constitutional majority. His 131 seats are more than enough to form a government, but insufficient for a profound restructuring of the judicial or anti-corruption architecture without ad hoc agreements with pro-European forces, primarily with the PP–DB. Second, he does not come from the right-wing populist Orbán tradition, but from a left-wing, post-communist milieu. Third, Bulgaria is far more dependent on European funding than its pre-election rhetoric would have us believe. Finally, he is a former Air Force general who studied in the U.S. and built his career within the Western security framework.

“Comparisons with Orbán are misplaced,” says Pietrzak. His argument is simple: Bulgaria cannot afford a prolonged conflict with Brussels, because without European money and external legitimacy, Radev will not be able to fulfill his own socioeconomic promises. This does not automatically make him a pro-Ukrainian politician, but it narrows the scope for Orban-style maneuvering. Additionally, unlike Robert Fico, Radev does not have to build his government on a coalition with far-right, anti-Ukrainian partners, and thus is not under the same internal pressure from an openly anti-Kyiv partner.

There is also one important caveat to the pre-election rhetoric. Radev did indeed make it clear that Sofia should not block the 90-billion-euro EU loan for Ukraine. However, the legal framework of this mechanism paints a more nuanced picture: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia have been excluded from budgetary commitments under the Ukraine Support Loan, while Bulgaria, according to EU Council documents, is among the 25 states participating in the enhanced cooperation mechanism. In other words, Bulgarian caution exists, but it is not equivalent to Orbán’s veto power. This is a fundamental difference that should be kept in mind both in Kyiv and in European capitals.

The simplest and at the same time most dangerous mistake is to assume that Radev’s victory automatically turns Bulgaria into a tool of the Kremlin. Ukraine’s interest in the Bulgarian case extends not only to diplomacy but also to manufacturing. The Bulgarian defense industry has long been integrated into supplies for Ukraine and for those European states that are arming Ukraine. This connection will not be undone by a single election campaign.

“Practically all countries that want to help Kyiv buy ammunition right here, because Bulgaria actually produces it,” emphasizes Pietrzak. This is not just about old Soviet calibers. Bulgaria has already finalized a major project with Rheinmetall and the Vazov Machine-Building Plant in Sopot regarding propellant and 155-mm ammunition, and the manufacturing sector itself is becoming increasingly integrated into the European defense industry. In this configuration, a sharp reversal against Ukraine would mean a blow to its own manufacturers, jobs, and long-term contracts.

Drossev sees it even more straightforwardly: Radev may afford to “play with carefully controlled fire” in his rhetoric, but he is unlikely to risk taking concrete steps that contradict the European strategy of supporting Ukraine. Otherwise, he would quickly face simultaneous domestic protests, external pressure, and a crisis of confidence from those who voted for him as a manager of stability, not as a destroyer of ties with the West.

For Kyiv, a sobering conclusion follows from this. In the immediate term, the danger does not lie in Sofia suddenly cutting off all channels of cooperation. The danger lies elsewhere: in slower decision-making, in attempts to blur political lines, and in playing on the themes of “cheaper gas,” “war fatigue,” and “pragmatic dialogue.” Under Radev, Bulgaria may become not a stronghold of open sabotage, but a platform for a softer, yet still harmful, redefinition of the parameters of the discussion.

The most serious threat is not linked to an immediate shift in geopolitical orientation, but to the internal structure of power. Drossev speaks openly of the risk of an authoritarian-populist concentration of power if the weak opposition fails to reorganize and impose real political control over Radev. His parliamentary bloc is large, but it is formed around a movement rather than an established party. In such a model, the personalization of decisions and the confinement of power within a “ruling capsule” become not an aberration, but almost a natural tendency.

Russian propaganda is a separate issue. It is precisely this propaganda that is interested in presenting Radev as a “new Orbán,” even if Radev himself does not go as far as Moscow expects him to. For the Kremlin, ideology has long been secondary. It is satisfied with openly far-right forces like “Revival,” post-communist networks, and corrupt status-quo groups, as long as they undermine trust in the EU, erode consensus on Ukraine, or shift the conversation from security to the topic of “normalization” with Russia. The Bulgarian case demonstrates precisely this: Moscow can simultaneously play on the radical flank and employ softened “pragmatic” rhetoric, provided both approaches weaken European unity.

Therefore, the Western, Polish, and partly Ukrainian media narrative that “pro-Russian = the new Orbán” is too simplistic. It overlooks the most important point: in Bulgaria, Russian influence operates not only through party labels but also through historical memory, social discontent, the image of a “strong state” in the media, the issue of cheap energy, and the lack of a quality domestic opposition. It is precisely in such an environment that an ambiguous politician like Radev can be both limited and dangerous.

This logic will face a new test this fall. If Radev’s camp extends its control to the presidential sphere, Bulgaria will enter a cycle where the question will no longer be about a “new Orbán,” but about a new configuration of power with very weak checks and balances. For Kyiv, this means the need to closely monitor not only Sofia’s foreign policy statements but also the internal architecture of power within Bulgaria itself.

For Ukraine, the response must be measured, without panic and without self-deception. Radev is not simply Orbán’s stand-in: he lacks a constitutional majority, does not stand on the same ideological platform, is not dependent on a far-right coalition, and operates in a country deeply integrated into European finance and the defense market.

But this does not mean his victory is secure. The real risk lies in the concentration of power, in the temptation to replace reforms with populist management of expectations, in the weakness of the opposition, and in the ability of Russian propaganda to exploit any rift within the EU and NATO.

That is precisely why Radev should be watched not for his loud insults, but for his concrete decisions: how Sofia will vote in Brussels, what will happen with defense contracts, how the judicial system will change, and whether Bulgaria will be able to avoid a new concentration of power within a single political project.

Author: Artur Żak