Russian strikes on Ukraine are aimed ever more often not only at military targets but at civilian ones – at the infrastructure the functioning of the state depends on. Railway stations and junctions, track, depots, wagons, locomotives and other parts of the transport system come under attack, and with them the people: Ukrzaliznytsia staff and passengers. At the same time the railway remains critical for civilian transport, evacuation, the delivery of humanitarian cargo and military logistics. How resilient is Ukraine’s transport system after more than four years of Russia’s full-scale war? What are the consequences of systematic attacks on the railway? Can infrastructure be protected from strikes, and how quickly can it be repaired afterwards? We discuss this with Vasyl Shevchenko, an expert who served as first deputy minister of transport and communications of Ukraine in 2008–2010.
In brief:
- The railway remains critical for Ukraine. It carries military and civilian logistics, evacuation, passenger traffic, humanitarian cargo and exports, says Vasyl Shevchenko, first deputy minister of transport and communications of Ukraine in 2008–2010.
- Russia attacks the transport system systematically. The strikes target not only track but locomotives, depots, energy infrastructure, junction stations and bridges – with the aim of exhausting the whole network.
- Ukraine’s railway holds up thanks to reserves and fast repair. Duplicate routes, diesel traction, quick work by repair crews and the ability to restore damaged sections fast keep the trains running even after attacks.
- The biggest risks are power supply and locomotives. Track and wagons can be repaired or replaced relatively quickly, while the loss of locomotives and repair capacity is a far harder problem.
- The future of the transport system lies in integration with Europe and in decentralisation. Ukraine needs European-gauge track, new logistics routes, “dry ports”, autonomous power supply, reserve capacity and infrastructure designed for the new security threats.
Mr Shevchenko, how do you assess the current state of Ukraine’s transport infrastructure after more than four years of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine?
In my view, Ukraine’s transport infrastructure is in a state of dynamic resilience. On the one hand the network has suffered large-scale destruction and operates under constant threat of shelling; on the other it has become an example of high adaptability, responsive logistics and capital rebuilding around new export and import routes.
Let us go through the key sectors.
If we talk about rail transport, Ukrzaliznytsia remains the main backbone of the country’s economy and logistics. The railway has successfully reoriented itself towards military needs, mass evacuation, passenger services and new western export corridors. At the same time the systemic challenges remain: a shortage of electrification on some sections because of damage to the power system, wear on the rolling stock, and the need for constant repair of track and stations. As for roads and bridges, they have suffered large-scale destruction, especially in front-line regions and in de-occupied territories. The key focus of the government and international partners is on quickly erecting temporary crossings, restoring critical bridges and expanding the capacity of western border crossing points. As for sea and river logistics, it was precisely the creation and protection of our own maritime corridor by the Defence Forces that made it possible to partly restore the full operation of the Greater Odesa ports for grain and steel exports. In parallel, the role of the Danube ports – Izmail and Reni – has grown substantially; they serve as a critical back-up route.
Civil aviation in Ukraine is not operating, because the sky is closed?
Yes, civil air traffic remains completely closed for security reasons, which places an increased load on rail and road infrastructure.
Russia regularly attacks railway infrastructure – stations, junctions, track, depots, locomotives and wagons. Why does the railway remain such an important target?
The railway is the main artery of Ukraine’s military and civilian logistics, so targeted strikes on it are intended to paralyse key links inside the country. Several main directions can be identified here. First, it is the logistical basis of defence and supply. Rail transport moves heavy weaponry, armour, ammunition and fuel in bulk over long distances. No other mode of transport – road or river – can provide the volumes and speed the front requires. Second, it is the economic backbone and the export corridors. With civil aviation closed and seaports blocked or at risk, it is the railway that serves as the main channel for exporting agricultural and steel products and for importing critically important goods, petroleum products above all. Destroying junction stations and border crossings is an attempt to do maximum damage to Ukraine’s economy. Third, civilian and passenger mobility. The railway remains the main means of travel for millions of citizens, for diplomatic missions, for the medical evacuation of the wounded and for humanitarian deliveries. Strikes on stations, depots and the railway’s power infrastructure are meant to complicate evacuation, sow panic and disrupt links between regions. And fourth, the vulnerability of the network itself. Railway infrastructure has a number of critical points whose destruction causes long delays. These are the electrified sections, because strikes on traction substations put electric locomotives out of action and force a rapid switch to diesel traction. They are the junction stations and bridges: putting a large marshalling yard or a bridge crossing out of action creates bottlenecks and forces complex detours. And they are the specialised rolling stock: destroying locomotives and repair depots takes considerable time and resources to make good. Yet despite constant attacks the rail network retains high flexibility thanks to duplicate routes, the rapid response of repair crews and the prompt redistribution of traction stock.
The railway is the main artery of Ukraine’s military and civilian logistics, so targeted strikes on it are intended to paralyse key links inside the country.
How systematic are these Russian attacks? Can we speak of an attempt by Russia to gradually disable not individual facilities but Ukraine’s transport system as such?
The attacks on railway and transport infrastructure are entirely systemic, planned and cascading in character. The enemy’s practice shows a shift from pinpoint strikes on individual facilities to a consistent strategy of exhausting the whole transport network. Why am I convinced of this? Because I see the marks of a systemic strategy of destroying infrastructure. Instead of hitting only track, which is repaired relatively quickly – within hours to a day – they deliberately destroy locomotives, both diesel and electric, and locomotive depots. A shortage of traction is the key risk, and it cannot be covered quickly. There are also the strikes on the railway’s power infrastructure. Systematic damage to traction substations is meant to paralyse electric locomotives and force the railway to switch entirely to diesel traction, which slows movement considerably and consumes scarce fuel. I would also name the junction stations and bridge crossings. Deliberate strikes on marshalling yards, bridges and border infrastructure in the west of the country aim to tear the single network into isolated sections and complicate logistics between the west and the front. And there are the repeat strikes, the double taps. Repeat attacks on the sites of repair work are aimed at destroying the repair crews, specialised machinery and recovery trains. Why has it not been possible to disable the system entirely? Despite the enemy’s attempts to cause a full systemic collapse – a systemic halt to traffic – Ukraine’s transport system shows a very high level of what one might call survivability. Because there is structural redundancy: the Soviet architecture of the rail network was designed with military action in mind and has a substantial reserve of duplicate routes and parallel lines. There is also the speed of repair. Railway repair crews and track workers have developed unique protocols for quickly building temporary detours, replacing bridge spans and restoring track. And, of course, flexibility of management. Switching promptly to reserve traction, adjusting timetables in real time and decentralising dispatch control make it possible to keep the network connected even with significant damage to individual nodes.
The attacks on railway and transport infrastructure are entirely systemic, planned and cascading in character.
In one interview you said that “a country will exist for as long as its infrastructure exists”. What does that thesis mean in practice today? What minimum level of transport operation does the state need to remain resilient?
Today that thesis has moved from the realm of academic formulations into the sphere of the state’s daily survival. In practice it means that infrastructure is not simply a matter of comfort or business but the foundation of sovereignty and of physical control over territory. If the transport system breaks up into isolated fragments, the state loses the ability to manoeuvre resources, to defend itself and to hold an economic balance. For the state to remain functional during a protracted war, the transport network must unconditionally provide four critical functions: continuity of military logistics, a minimum export and import parity, evacuation and medical links, and the basic integrity and connectedness of the internal market. Put simply, this means the ability to move units, ammunition, heavy equipment and fuel between the front and the rear without glaring delays. It means preserving reserve and lateral front-line routes that allow troops to be manoeuvred quickly. It also means the capacity to export volumes of agricultural and steel output – volumes sufficient to cover basic budget revenue and foreign currency earnings. Among the important factors I would also name securing imports of critical categories: petroleum products, electronics, medicines and military-technical aid, through the western border and the sea and Danube channels. It is also about a guaranteed channel for medical evacuation of the wounded from front-line regions to hospitals in the rear, and the ability to evacuate civilians promptly if the situation worsens on particular axes. Another very important area is the ability to deliver food, medicines and fuel to every regional centre under our control and to the large urban agglomerations – and to preserve rail or road connections as an instrument for administering and holding territory.
Infrastructure is not simply a matter of comfort or business but the foundation of sovereignty and of physical control over territory. If the transport system breaks up into isolated fragments, the state loses the ability to manoeuvre resources, to defend itself and to hold an economic balance.
What does that mean in practice today?
In practice the critical minimum is defined not by the percentage of infrastructure preserved but by the capacity of the key nodes and the speed with which they can be restored. For example, even if 30–40% of the network or of the nodes is damaged, the system is considered functional as long as it remains possible to bypass the destroyed sections – via reserve track or bridge crossings – and the traction potential is preserved. By that I mean the locomotive fleet, autonomous power supply, alternative fuel. Losing basic connectivity turns regions into “islands”, which makes both centralised defence and a single system of logistical support impossible. That is why keeping the main lines running is a direct condition of the state’s survival.
Does Ukraine have a sufficient margin of safety today? If attacks on the railway continue at the present rate, where might the critical limit appear – in track, locomotives, wagons, power supply or human resources?
The system’s margin of safety remains substantial, but it is ceasing to be an unlimited resource. The enemy’s shift to a concept of “targeted exhaustion” creates a clear gradation of where the nearest critical limit lies. The high-risk area is power supply. Massed attacks on the energy system force the railway regularly to switch electrified main lines to reserve diesel traction. That creates additional pressure on the locomotive fleet, since using diesel locomotives requires far more fuel and increases the load on a limited number of diesel machines. As for human resources and repair crews, people restore infrastructure to critically tight deadlines under the threat of repeat strikes. But track and the wagon fleet are where resilience is greatest. Track, for instance, is the most repairable element: point damage to the roadbed or embankments is cleared within a few hours to two days. And the fleet of freight and passenger wagons has a substantial reserve, so local losses of individual wagons do not significantly halt overall traffic. The margin of safety holds not because there is no damage but thanks to pre-emptive adaptation.
The system’s margin of safety remains substantial, but it is ceasing to be an unlimited resource. The enemy’s shift to a concept of “targeted exhaustion” creates a clear gradation of where the nearest critical limit lies.
One of your arguments is that a single train can replace hundreds of lorries. What would happen to Ukraine’s logistics if the railway’s capacity were substantially limited?
If the railway’s capacity fell substantially, Ukraine would face a cascading logistics crisis that road transport could not fully compensate for. One standard freight train carries 2,000–4,000 tonnes of cargo, roughly 50–60 wagons. To replace one such train you need between 80 and 150 heavy lorries. Shifting trunk volumes from rail to road would bring critical consequences in several areas. Road haulage, river arteries and multimodal container solutions can back up critical directions, but they act as a supplement, not as a full replacement for the rail backbone.
Shifting trunk volumes from rail to road would bring critical consequences in several areas.
Russian strikes increasingly affect rolling stock – locomotives, wagons, repair capacity. How hard is it to make good such losses quickly? Does Ukraine have enough capacity for manufacturing and repair?
Making good losses of rolling stock and depots has a clear specificity: for wagons and track, domestic capacity remains high, but for locomotives the situation is far more complicated. Locomotives, both electric and diesel, are the hardest sector to compensate quickly, because of a combination of three factors. There is the absence of our own serial production: Ukraine does not build its own mainline electric or diesel locomotives in a complete cycle. Replenishing the fleet is possible only through imports – for example buying new machines from international manufacturers such as Alstom or Wabtec, or receiving used equipment from partners. There is also the specificity of the 1,520 mm gauge. The main locomotive reserve in Europe is built for the narrower 1,435 mm gauge and for different catenary voltage standards. It is impossible to lease or move electric locomotives over from the EU quickly – deep adaptation is needed, changing bogies or buying compatible machines from the Baltic states or Finland. And there is the complexity of repair. Modern repairs after heavy blast damage require unique components: diesel engines, traction motors, electronics. Many domestic repair plants are themselves under constant threat of strikes, which forces repair capacity to be dispersed and work to be carried out underground or in sheltered locations.
How can the railway be protected from missile and drone attacks? What is more effective: physical protection of facilities, dispersal, reserve routes, fast repair, or a combination of these?
Protecting the rail network from combined missile and drone strikes is impossible with any single “universal” solution. The railway is thousands of kilometres of linear objects that physically cannot be covered by an air-defence “dome”. Effectiveness is achieved solely through a comprehensive combination of five levels of protection, in which each element plays its own role. These are active air defence and electronic warfare, passive protection, dispersal and camouflage. What works best? The most effective is a combination of physical protection of infrastructure “points” with high speed of repair and dispersal of rolling stock. Any stationary object can be destroyed or damaged if the enemy spends enough missiles on it; but if the system is able to restore traffic fully within 6–12 hours and has reserve routes, the enemy’s attacks lose their strategic effectiveness.
Can Ukraine’s railway be made less dependent on the large transport hubs that are obvious targets for Russian strikes?
Removing the railway’s dependence on large transport hubs entirely is impossible because of the very geometry of the tracks, but substantially reducing how critical those hubs are for the integrity of the whole system is entirely realistic. That calls for a set of operational and engineering solutions.
What role can European partners and allies play in protecting Ukraine’s transport infrastructure? Is it only about financing, or also about technology, equipment, repair capacity and joint planning?
The role of the European allies long ago went beyond direct grants and loans. Practical cooperation covers the full spectrum – from prompt technical assistance and the supply of specialised equipment to strategic network planning and the harmonisation of safety standards. Partners hand over critically important equipment to keep the network alive under systematic attack. In particular, autonomous power supply: the delivery of powerful diesel generators to feed interlocking posts, signalling, communications and key nodes during blackouts. There is also specialised machinery for reconstruction: lorries, tippers, excavators, tractor units and special transport, including systemic help under the Team Europe initiatives and EU funds, which allows emergency crews to restore track, embankments and bridge crossings quickly. It is worth adding that European institutions and investment banks, the EIB and the EBRD, are the main partners in changing the structure of the rail corridors. That includes financing and delivering projects to build standard European-gauge track – for example drawing on the Connecting Europe Facility for the Chop–Uzhhorod and Mostyska II–Sknyliv/Lviv sections. That removes the need to change bogies and relieves the border hubs. The EU Agency for Railways (ERA) provides direct expert support on adapting Ukrainian legislation to the requirements of technical interoperability and traffic safety within the Single European Railway Area. And it also means finding, transferring and technically adapting compatible diesel locomotives from the Baltic states, Poland and other countries that have or have used the 1,520 mm gauge, as well as supplying components. Among the main areas are the adaptation of rolling stock, joint logistical and strategic planning and the Solidarity Lanes; and also joint control, optimisation and synchronisation of timetables at the border crossings between Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, and the building of dry ports. In other words, partnership with the EU makes it possible not merely to react to current destruction but at the same time to carry out a capital transformation of Ukraine’s transport system – turning it from an isolated Soviet-model network into an integrated part of the European transport area.
The role of the European allies long ago went beyond direct grants and loans. Practical cooperation covers the full spectrum – from prompt technical assistance and the supply of specialised equipment to strategic network planning and the harmonisation of safety standards.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has in effect created a new transport map of Ukraine. Will it change after the war ends? What should the railway – and the transport system as a whole – look like to match the new security realities?
Ukraine’s new transport map has been formed by two main vectors: the complete rupture of logistics on the eastern axis, and deep, irreversible integration into the European transport area (TEN-T). A return to the pre-war configuration of the network is impossible. The transport system of post-war Ukraine will be rebuilt on the principles of military-industrial resilience, decentralisation and greater technological sophistication.
Could you explain that?
Any large infrastructure project – a bridge, a marshalling yard, a depot, a container terminal – will be designed with protection against weapons in mind and with the ability to adapt quickly to military logistics. Instead of the concept of “a single transhipment point”, a European-standard network is being built deep into the country, in particular on the Uzhhorod, Lviv and Chernivtsi axes with access to the central hubs. That will ensure uninterrupted movement of passenger and freight trains without delays for changing bogies. There is also the network of so-called dry ports and multimodality: instead of a few monopoly junction stations, a decentralised network of private and state freight terminals is being created at the intersections of rail and road trunk routes. That will reduce the risk of the system being paralysed if one of the nodes is damaged. And, of course, autonomy and energy decentralisation. Critical railway infrastructure and depots will be fitted with autonomous power sources, in particular solar plants and powerful storage. The traction fleet will be built up with back-up diesel and hybrid locomotives.
A separate question is civil aviation. Ukraine’s sky remains closed. Could air traffic be restored relatively quickly once hostilities stop, or will the damage to infrastructure and the security questions require considerably more time?
Restoring civil air traffic after active hostilities end will not be instantaneous. Even with a swift political and military decision the process will take from several months to a year, because strict international safety regulations have to be met. How fast aviation returns depends above all on the format in which the war ends and on clear international guarantees of safety in Ukrainian airspace.
Looking strategically at the years ahead, what does Ukraine need to do now so that its transport infrastructure is ready not only for reconstruction but for possible new threats?
For the transport system to be ready for reconstruction and for new threats, the strategic focus has to shift from “prompt repair” to a fundamental rebuilding of the network’s architecture. The main task is to build a flexible system, integrated with the EU and resilient to external shocks.
For the transport system to be ready for reconstruction and for new threats, the strategic focus has to shift from “prompt repair” to a fundamental rebuilding of the network’s architecture.
Thank you!
Interview by Svitlana Mialyk
