The parliamentary elections in Hungary on April 12, 2026, resulted in a spectacular defeat for Viktor Orbán and FIDESZ. The opposition TISZA, led by Péter Magyar, secured a constitutional majority following a very fierce and emotional election campaign. Relations with Ukraine became Orbán’s top priority—to such an extent that jokes are circulating in the country that voters were surprised by the absence of Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the ballots. On the other hand, Orbán’s ties to Vladimir Putin and Russia also worked against him. Some also warned of Russian interference in the elections.
- The TISZA party, led by Péter Magyar, won a constitutional majority in the parliamentary elections in Hungary.
- The elections were deemed technically fair, despite the systemic advantage and unequal campaign conditions created by FIDESZ.
- The election campaign revealed close coordination between Viktor Orbán’s government and the Kremlin, as well as attempts at Russian disinformation.
- Brutal methods of discrediting the opposition leader were employed, including fabricated allegations of a moral nature.
- FIDESZ’s pro-Russian rhetoric and focus on the conflict with Ukraine proved ineffective and contributed to the defeat of the incumbent government.
Fair Elections – A Campaign That Fell Short
It is worth noting right away that the elections proceeded peacefully, without disruptions or violations. Outgoing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán accepted the results without contesting his defeat.
Dr. Łukasz Lewkowicz, assistant professor in the Department of Political Thought and Political Communication at the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, summarizes:
“The parliamentary elections in Hungary on April 12, 2026, can be considered formally democratic and fair, though not necessarily equal in terms of campaign conditions. A key indicator is the swift acceptance of the results by outgoing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, which in practice means that even the ruling camp does not question the vote-counting process. Given the clear lead of the winning TISZA party, any manipulation would have had to be on a very large scale, and so far no credible evidence of such actions has emerged. At the same time, one must separate the issue of the technical integrity of the elections from the quality of the political competition itself. In recent years, the Hungarian system has been criticized for structural advantages enjoyed by the ruling camp, such as media dominance, the use of state resources, and unequal campaign conditions. We must also not forget the changes to the electoral code and the manipulation of electoral district boundaries in recent years.
This means that the elections could have been both properly conducted and unfair. Reports of irregularities so far have been largely incidental and local in nature, rather than systemic, so there is no basis for claiming that they affected the final result.”
These conclusions are confirmed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s election observation report. It highlights the systemic advantage gained by Viktor Orbán’s party, which over 16 years in power has blurred the lines between party and state. Observers also highlight the divisive rhetoric and fear-mongering employed by FIDESZ, including accusations that its opponents are under foreign influence.
The OSCE report accuses Hungary’s ruling party of extensively exploiting public resources for its own benefit, using government communications as a tool for political agitation, clear favoritism toward FIDESZ by public media, as well as regulatory loopholes in campaign financing that led to an imbalance of resources between candidates from the ruling camp and the opposition.
The allegations against the TISZA party regarding the representation of foreign interests and foreign influence are ironic in that, at the same time, Viktor Orbán eagerly sought the support of the U.S. presidential administration, culminating in a visit by U.S. Vice President JD Vance four days before the election. During his stay in Budapest at a meeting at Mátyás Korvin University, JD Vance also accused the European Union of conducting a “foreign influence operation in Hungary.”
Russian-Hungarian Coordination of Actions
Another key element of the campaign was the issue of the Hungarian government’s ties to the Kremlin. On April 7, a transcript of a phone call between Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Russian dictator Vladimir Putin was published. In the transcript of the conversation revealed by Bloomberg, we read: “Yesterday, our friendship rose to such a high level that I can help in every possible way—in our Hungarian picture books there is a story in which a mouse helps a lion (…) I am ready to help immediately… In any matter where I can be of assistance, I am at your service.” One of these matters was reportedly the organization of a peace summit between Russia and the U.S. in Budapest. It is worth noting that such a proposal was indeed made and was generally well-received, including by Donald Trump.
A day later, a consortium of investigative journalists revealed transcripts of conversations from 2023–2025 between Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov. These reveal that the Orbán government provided the Russians with documents concerning, for example, Ukraine’s EU accession process.
However, such subservience to the Kremlin on the part of the FIDESZ government does not equate to Russian interference in the electoral process itself. The question should rather concern Russian involvement in the election campaign.
According to Hungarian sources, Viktor Orbán received assistance from Moscow in the form of an advisory team. The question of the effectiveness of these actions and their actual implementation remains open. It was supposed to be an influence campaign comparable to, or perhaps even carried out by the same individuals who acted on behalf of the Kremlin in Moldova. However, the Russian assistance was reportedly implemented ineptly—for example, anti-opposition narratives were reportedly spread through Russian-language channels, which do not have a large audience in Hungary.
The fact remains, however, that there is a commonality between the narratives of Russian and Hungarian disinformation channels. András Rácz, a Hungarian expert on Russia, said in an interview with Telex.hu that the narratives of the Kremlin and FIDESZ were coordinated, and that at least three Russian agencies were involved in the Hungarian elections, including the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.
However, as Dr. Lewkowicz says
“There is no hard, publicly confirmed evidence that Russian advisers directly managed the 2026 election campaign in Hungary. We are talking rather about indirect, inspirational, and methodological influence that has grown over the years, rather than formal ‘external campaign management.’”
The OSCE observation mission itself also sparked controversy regarding possible Russian influence. Daria Boyarskaya, who worked for many years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, is employed as a senior advisor in the international secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. She accompanied Putin as an interpreter, for example, at the G20 meetings in Tokyo in 2019. While working for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she also collaborated with the OSCE as an external interpreter. Since January 2021, Boyarskaya has been employed directly by the OSCE PA; she is not seconded by the Russian Federation and is responsible, among other things, for coordinating election observation missions.
According to publicly available information, Boyarskaya herself was not part of the observation mission and did not participate in the drafting of the report.
Dirty campaign tactics
It is easy to observe tactics straight out of the Kremlin propaganda playbook that were employed in the campaign against the TISZA party, and particularly its leader Péter Magyar. The case of the alleged autobiographical book by his ex-wife Judit Varga, “16 Years with a Monster: The Confession of Péter Magyar’s Ex-Wife,” caused a major stir.
In the book, she allegedly described Magyar’s alcohol problems, sexual behavior he supposedly engaged in in front of the children, and even cooking one of the family dogs alive in a microwave oven. This information was published by the UniqueMongolia account on the X platform. Of course, it was entirely fabricated from start to finish, although these narratives were picked up and continue to be repeated by Orbán’s allies, including abroad.
In February of this year, after a period of blackmail, Hungarian journalists received a sex tape featuring Peter Magyar and his former partner. The video was also said to show drugs that Magyar and the woman were allegedly using. These allegations were not confirmed, and Magyar filed a report regarding a possible crime in connection with the release of the recording.
Such tactics did not negatively impact TISZA’s poll numbers. Magyar accused FIDESZ of attempted blackmail. However, there is still no direct evidence of Orbán’s circle’s involvement in the creation and distribution of the recording. Blackmailing with alleged sex scandals and drug excesses resembles Soviet methods of discrediting opponents. Magyar himself described them exactly this way.
Putin’s defeat in Hungary
According to announcements, Magyar’s government will not continue Viktor Orbán’s pro-Russian policy. However, one should not expect a sudden shift toward a pro-Ukrainian stance. From the future prime minister’s statements, one can conclude that Hungary will not block the European Union’s pro-Ukrainian initiatives, though it does not necessarily intend to join them. It also remains skeptical of Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
Amid all the discussion about Russian influence during the election campaign, however, one thing must be made clear: it did not yield the results the Kremlin had hoped for. One might even conclude that it worked to FIDESZ’s disadvantage. Record voter turnout and the landslide victory of the former opposition prove that Hungarians wanted change.
However, other issues, such as the fight against corruption or economic factors, are cited as the main reasons. FIDESZ’s focus on international issues, including stoking the dispute with Ukraine in the pre-election period, did not fall on fertile ground, as it simply was not a key issue for Hungarian voters. On the other hand, ties to the Kremlin have led to a perceived increase in corruption within Orbán’s government.
Dismantling Orbán’s system will be the main goal of Magyar’s government. The question is whether the issue of Russian influence will be significant in this context. For now, there is no indication that “de-Russification” will be a key element—and this is not what Hungarians are likely expecting.
