Dr. Darin Drossev, President of the Integration Research Institute in Sofia, analyses the outcome of Bulgaria’s parliamentary elections of 19 April 2026 and what the sweeping victory of Rumen Radev’s „Progressive Bulgaria” coalition means for the country’s political future, its commitments to Ukraine, and its place in Europe.
In short:
- Radev has won a dominant four-year mandate, but his parliamentary group lacks legislative experience and is built around a movement, not a party — raising serious questions about pluralism inside his ruling coalition.
- Despite the rhetoric, Radev is a cautious, geopolitically constrained actor who is unlikely to break with NATO, the EU, or the broad European consensus on supporting Ukraine.
- Russian propaganda will try to cast Radev as the new Orbán, but this projection is a simulation — one that Radev himself will work to neutralise, while carefully not alienating the pro-Russian part of his electorate.
- The existing opposition — above all PP–DB — failed to capitalise on the election and remains structurally weak, creating a dangerous vacuum that could accelerate the emergence of a new political force.
- The autumn presidential elections will be the decisive test: if Radev’s camp wins the presidency as well, Bulgaria enters a prolonged period of power concentrated in a single political project with authoritarian populist characteristics.
- Radev’s most immediate challenge is economic —he must deliver on purchasing power, or face street opposition in the early stages of his rule.
What does Rumen Radev’s „Progressive Bulgaria” victory mean for Bulgaria? What are the threats and what are the opportunities?
We can categorically say that we have a radically different wave which won this four-year term and will govern Bulgarian politics. There is absolutely no doubt we will have their four-year term.
But we are still facing the horizon of expectations. The leader of „Progressive Bulgaria” is a former President, but as a political player we haven’t seen either his concrete actions in the political processes or his programme, which to a great extent is perceived as vague or abstract, based only on desires and expectations. This mixture between political rhetoric and political platform, which he imposed quite successfully, is creating a space for doubts that now dominate the political discourse in Bulgaria.
In most electoral districts, „Progressive Bulgaria” placed at the top of its candidate lists individuals whose public visibility outweighs their professional expertise, particularly in areas relevant to legislative work. This, to a great extent, generated a suspicion that his campaign is based much more on populism than to a realistic desire backed with relevant capacity to generate an effective change of the political status quo. However, we have to keep in mind that Radev used to have a very strong strategic team during his presidency. He had three caretaker governments, during whose terms he managed to generate significant political power — he was effectively in power during all three. The prolonged political crisis created the conditions for Radev’s seizing of the levers of power, kept through his very close circle. He managed to preserve his prestige throughout all three caretaker governments.
This brings forward the suspicion that, with „Progressive Bulgaria”’s parliamentary block of such an unprecedented size, lacking the necessary spectrum of experts in legislation and politics, Radev would probably rely on his same very close and obviously encapsulated circle to continue governing, without genuine pluralism.
The parallel with the former Hungarian leader is quite unrealistic in terms of Rumen Radev’s true intentions. This is only an election campaign rhetoric, which has already produced its populist impact on the pro-Russian part of the electorate and will gradually start to wear out as a topic of anti-EU policy suspicions.
Regarding the “new Orbán” threat, I think that our European audience should be calm about that. That suspicion is much more an overspeculation in the political discourse fuelled by the mainstream pro-EU government media and also the official Russian state propaganda machine. The parallel with the former Hungarian leader is quite unrealistic in terms of Rumen Radev’s true intentions. This is only an election campaign rhetoric, which has already produced its populist impact on the pro-Russian part of the electorate and will gradually start to wear out as a topic of anti-EU policy suspicions. It will probably remain longer in the Russian state controlled media space, because of the convenient for the Russian public myth that EU is in crisis and its strong opposition persists. Radev will, quite logically and gradually start to avoid associations with Orbán, because this already obsolete parallel back from the months of his campaign could produce a serious backfire during the initial, consolidating stages of his positioning as a strong player in the EU politics.
You said that he would like to avoid being compared to Orbán. But from your point of view, can Radev and his party be called pro-Russian, and can they replace Orbán in the European Union — blocking anti-Russia measures or pro-Ukrainian measures and becoming a new Hungary?
I understand the importance of these issues and the legitimate concerns we, as Europeans, inevitably have. To give an appropriate answer, we should first consider Radev’s system of aims, which is rooted in the nature of his political character. Radev is a safe player. He always plays the safe game. As an example, let me go back briefly to the first serious, mass protests in 2020 and his famous gesture of a raised fist — quite notorious at the time, when he went outside his presidential building and met the crowd. According to many political theorists and local analysts — not only his opponents but also his supporters — at that moment Radev missed the opportunity to resign his term of office and enter into politics directly. If he were not quite that safe a player, he would have done so. He had a second chance during the next political crisis and the newly opened election window. He chose to stay in office again, keeping his resignation as far away as possible in order to preserve his safety between the walls of his president’s office. Of course, Radev very skillfully used this prolongation to build up political momentum, but that strategy could have very easily depleted his strength if the 2025 protests, organized by PP-DB didn’t take place and the regular government did not resign as a result.
In practice, however, this cannot go beyond subtle rhetorics. Radev is quite smart and skillful not to take the risk of immediately entering into a Eurosceptical or pro-Russian political course.
So, what will his strategy be? I think Radev will be buying time. He will be elusive in his rhetoric. He would play the populist. He would keep fuelling the Russian propaganda machine with simulated hopes for becoming their “fifth column” in Europe. That would be a win-win tactics—the Russian public receives nice examples of “the EU in crisis”, while their Bulgarian pro-Russian counterpart notices with national pride that Radev is covered by the Russian official media. In practice, however, this cannot go beyond subtle rhetorics. Radev is quite smart and skillful not to take the risk of immediately entering into a Eurosceptical or pro-Russian political course.
However, the pragmatic promise, given by Radev, pertaining to the economic side of Bulgaria’s relations with Russia is to be taken seriously. The current economic crisis, mostly felt as a significantly lower buying power of the Bulgarians, is to be dealt with quickly. Radev will be held strictly accountable by his supporters for his campaign promise to arrange buying cheaper natural gas from Russia. Failing to perform on this and similar campaign promises would have immediate negative consequences for the build-up of „Progressive Bulgaria”’s political structures and Radev’s project in general.
Finally, I think Radev is quite far from realistic resemblance with Orbán, but this simulated parallel will inevitably be kept in circulation—in most orthodox pro-European media—as a fuel to keep the fire (of fear from EU power status quo change) burning and, as I said, by the Official Russian state propaganda machine as “A New Hope” for a Russian come back in a weakened Europe. In reality, Radev is pro-European and pro-NATO. Let’s keep in mind that he is a Bulgarian Air Force general, who trained within NATO structures and completed advanced military education in the United States. In this context, he is unlikely to deviate from the Western geostrategic course.
What about Ukraine? There is intensive cooperation between Ukraine and the coalition supporting it with the Bulgarian defence industry. Do you think it will continue? And what can be Radev’s role regarding the next sanctions towards Russia or the European integration of Ukraine?
The answer to this question should be sought in the geopolitical and geostrategic processes taking place. Radev is guaranteed a four-year term. If he risks too much — and I’m sure he considers this — and starts cancelling the support for Ukraine which Bulgaria is giving as a true member of the European Union, this would be a serious error of judgement. The Bulgarian people in their majority support this cooperation. We should draw a distinction between those who vote and Bulgarian society as a whole, which feels itself to be an integral part of Europe. It is a just cause to support Ukraine and, I am convinced the majority of the Bulgarians share this opinion.
In the context of Radev’s eventual policy course, I think, he cannot allow himself to start cancelling that support. The United States themselves are not doing this and Radev would not go against our natural strategic and political family, which is NATO and Europe. Those lines we heard in his election campaign — that he would stop exporting weapons to Ukraine — are just rhetoric, being amplified by the official Russian propaganda machine and coming back enriched with intentions that cannot be true.
Radev is very well aware of the capacity of his political opposition and especially the PP–DB (the so called “liberal opposition”, a somewhat vague definition) — but they have the capacity to bring people to the square. The reason the previous government fell was exactly this: the capacity to bring people out and organise protests. Radev won’t risk this during the early stages of his rule, especially on the grounds of the readiness of his political rivals to deliver early, preemptive strikes, while „Progressive Bulgaria” still doesn’t have a party structure. They are still a vague, popular movement, and Radev is unlikely to risk any actions in conflict with the general European strategy and the natural support for Ukraine. At best he would play with a well-controlled fire, kept inside the political discourse, generating no particular actions.
How do you assess the pro-Russian sentiments among the public, business and political-media spheres in Bulgaria? We’ve seen the very poor performance of „Vazrazhdane”, which is openly anti-European, anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian and ultra-nationalist. So what are the sentiments in society?
The pro-Russian propaganda created effective and durable images of the past national grandeur based on the once existing Bulgarian heavy industry, developed agriculture, and strong military as a part of the Soviet bloc. Of course, the image of Russia as Bulgaria’s liberator from Ottoman yoke and the gratitude to Russia is to be considered as our national profile. The problem is not so much relevant to the Rusophilic sentiments in Bulgaria, but with the embracing of Putin’s power and international policy as an integral part of the image of Russia. “Vazrazhdane” (“Renaissance”), is the political party, which embraces that system of perceptions and openly declares itself as s pro-Russian party. They succeeded in passing the 4% threshold to participate in the current Parliament, but lost a significant number of their supporters’ votes in favour of Radev’s project. Such a quick shift of pro-Russian voters from “Vazrazhdane” to “Progressive Bulgaria” means something more than just economic pragmatism provoked by the inflation increase. It is a reconfirmation of the existence of a strong hope for “Bul-exit”, no matter the price and the consequences. The persistence of this symptomatic was skillfully harnessed by Radev to produce such skyrocket results. However, and I think he and his team already realize it, they will have to meet with these supporters. One day soon, the inevitable failure to perform in this impossible direction will bring the greatest disappointment in the minds of the pro-Russians, who will continue to be effectively bombarded by the Russian propaganda, the latter not meeting effective resistance in the Bulgarian public discourse. The failure to produce effective resistance against the Russian propaganda is a different but quite an important topic, which I hope we could discuss in another conversation. Anyway, the necessity to counter the pro-Russian propaganda goes hand in hand with the need to make a qualitative change in the Bulgarian political opposition. That is an issue, which becomes even more acute after the sweeping strength of Radev’s wave already started to raise issues, some of which we are trying to address in our conversation.
Radev’s constrained position
Given the contours of the current political environment, Radev’s hands are very tight: the geopolitical constraints, the strong European strategy to support Ukraine, the combined strength of the defeated political subjects, and his own nature as a safe player combine to define the limits within which he would operate. Once the members of „Progressive Bulgaria”’s parliamentary bloc are sworn, the challenges will start coming as an avalanche and Radev’s public support rating will start decreasing. Let’s also keep in mind that the 15% increase to overall 50% voter turnout created the false perception of a “mass” vote. The 50% voting deficit is still there and the persisting stagnated results of the parliamentary represented “liberal” opposition ring the bell. Probably, and hopefully, the Bulgarian public will start producing a truly democratic opposition, which would and should produce a positive influence on the already alarmingly powerful „Progressive Bulgaria”.
The opposition problem
In general, the current political opposition in Bulgaria consists of two conflicting wings: 1. GERB and DPS, who are forced to assume the role of opposition as the main losers; 2. PP-DB, who are currently experiencing internal conflicts and are likely to split as two different parliamentary blocs.
Those two wings are not capable of producing effective representation beyond their fixed electorate. GERB and DPS represent the old, already fallen political model, swept by Radev’s wave. The PP-DB wing, however, is more interesting to be considered, since it is the PP, which was brought to the political scene in 2020 by Radev himself as President, who appointed the leaders of PP as ministers in his first caretaker government. That was the beginning of PP, which later won the elections and formed a coalition government. That relationship between Radev and PP, no matter the exchange of verbal attacks in a certain period, is still to be considered seriously. In addition, the current caretaker Prime Minister Andrey Gurov was appointed by Radev’s former Vice and now interim President. It is Gurov’s Government, who organized the elections won by Radev, and now Gurov is being spoken of as a candidate in the forthcoming Presidential elections. These fact reveal suspicions of hidden collaborations, which would further concentrate political power in closed, limited circles. Is Radev working on fabricating a fake opposition and what would be the consequences—that is a question, whose answer is tightly related with the necessity to vigilantly observe and analyse in detail all forthcoming political processes. What if such a concentration of power becomes a fact? I think that would not be good for the Bulgarian democracy and for Europe, in this context. Strong and representative political opposition is a must in the contemporary democracy. Europe needs adequate political opposition subjects of new quality and different dimensions, effectively functioning in the different member states—that is the way to meet the challenges of the mercilessly emerging new world order.
What comes next: authoritarian risk and the autumn Presidential elections
As I said, the authoritarian risk is already here.
As I said, the authoritarian risk is already here. There should be a reaction to – not necessarily against – Radev’s wave, the very nature of pluralism and democracy requires it. „Progressive Bulgaria” wave will be the driving force of the forthcoming political processes in Bulgaria and will reflect Bulgaria’s participation in the European political life. It won’t be only Radev, who will try to play strong in Europe, much to the satisfaction of the Bulgarian national grandeur seekers. But the existing political opposition deficit will also be a main factor for both, the Bulgarian role in the EU and the further emancipation from obsolete but still effective foreign/hostile propaganda.
This opposition would inevitably and should be characterised by resistance against the threat of authoritarian populist tendency, which could quite possibly arise now, because Radev has the whole power in his hands. He has his ruling capsule, which will assume control over the „Progressive Bulgaria”’s parliamentary bloc. Moreover, the suspicion of a hidden support to a presidential candidate, who would play opposition is already on the political discourse horizon and generates alarming predictions in some more sharply critical, non-mainstream analytical circles.
The economic challenge
One reason for Radev’s wave was the economic crisis and the rise in inflation both before and after the adoption of the euro. Radev’s call from his Presidential office for a referendum on choosing the euro or preserving the lev generated movements and mass support in his favour. However, according to some economists, that early move of Radev actually only shifted the focus of attention away from the real causes for the rising prices, namely, the obvious price manipulation in the retail sector. He could have effectively called for better price control, but not leading anti-euro campaign, which he now denies. This and similar lines of criticism aside against Radev are expected to enter and shape the political discourse during the Presidential elections campaign.
Radev will now have the challenge of delivering on prices — to at least keep them stable and increase the purchasing power of the average Bulgarian citizen. Many of his supporters asked: why should we buy the same Russian gas, which anyway comes from Russia through several intermediaries, as American gas at a higher price? Let’s buy it directly from Russia, as Radev said. But he said that during his campaign, now such a statement becomes a serious challenge. Calling for overcoming the sanctions against Russia in favour of the Bulgarian economic interest won’t be that easy for him to achieve in reality.
Summary
Radev’s stunning, unprecedented, and unexpected victory is a fact. Now is faces the critical period—he must perform on his promises. Any failure could bring irreparable damages on his political project. If he fails to boost the purchasing power of the Bulgarian citizens, he could face street protests far sooner than even his rivals in the Parliament would expect.
The positive implication—if he succeeds to satisfy his electorate and keeps strong power position in Bulgaria and Europe would bring the long awaited by the Bulgarian people political and economic stability. However, for the time being, we will have to wait and watch.
Radev would now be buying time, both in the Bulgarian and the European political space. In Bulgaria, we should expect a process of political debates — former representatives of the old model licking their wounds and deploying their analysts in the public discourse, clashing with Radev’s paid analysts. In the European political media discourse, we will continue observing the same polarized perceptions of the Bulgarian political space—pro-European vs pro-Russian parties; pro- Ukraine vs anti-Ukraine. This is far from objective reality and, I think, the emergence of the Radev phenomenon would positively contribute to a change in this discourse, for there is much more to be discussed and worked for the adequate repositioning of the EU in a radically different political epoch and that requires profound debates beyond the current oversimplified binary framed topics in the mainstream media.
