What is the new political reality in Hungary following the elections, and what does Péter Magyar’s victory mean for the country and for Europe? Can we speak of a restart of democratic processes and a weakening of authoritarian tendencies? We discuss this with Serhiy Taran—a political scientist, renowned Ukrainian expert in the field of democratization and international security, and co-founder of the Institute of Mass Information.
In Brief
- Political Shock in Europe: Why Viktor Orbán’s Defeat After 16 Years in Power Signaled Change for the Entire Region
- A Chance for Democracy: Does Péter Magyar’s Victory Pave the Way for a Reboot of Democratic Processes in Hungary
- A Blow to Populism: How Voters Punished the Politics of “Enemy-Hunting” Over Real Reforms
- Russia’s Geopolitical Defeat: Why the Kremlin Is Losing Influence in Europe Along with Orbán’s Departure
- What’s Next for the EU and Ukraine: Will Hungary Become More Pro-European, and How Will This Affect Support for Ukraine
Mr. Serhiy, how unexpected was Viktor Orbán’s defeat after 16 years in power? Can we say that this marks a political turning point in Europe in recent years?
It was expected that Orbán would lose the election, but the question was whether he would be willing to relinquish power quickly, even if he lost.
Why was it expected in electoral terms?
Because Orbán’s defeat was evident from various opinion polls. Over the past year, they consistently showed Orbán trailing Magyar by an average of 10%. It was sometimes more, sometimes less, but always 10%. And when there is such a gap and it is stable, it is very difficult to do anything about it. Orban’s only chance was to stage some kind of emotional provocation. In fact, he tried to do just that, but it didn’t work out. And Ukraine didn’t fall for the provocation when a Hungarian delegation came to inspect the Druzhba oil pipeline; the arrest of the Ukrainian collectors didn’t go all the way, and fortunately, none of the Hungarians were killed, so that Ukraine couldn’t be blamed later. So the provocations failed, and, in principle, it was clear from the polls that this would be the outcome. The question was whether Orbán would be willing to relinquish power. And here’s the catch: for Orbán to give up power, he didn’t just have to lose—he had to lose by a landslide. It had to be clear that he’d truly lost, and indeed, he did. Now the opposition has a constitutional majority, and seeing this, Orbán handed over power, resolving this suspense.
Is this the biggest political turning point?
No, I wouldn’t say this is a turning point right now. What I like about this very question of a turning point is that the main problem for European politics right now is populism, which is growing against the backdrop of the Russian threat. It is precisely populism, I am convinced, that poses an even greater threat to Europe than Russia. Because it undermines the unity and accountability of European politicians. And many politicians—Orbán among them—this is a classic story; it came from this cohort. So I would say that populism has suffered a very serious defeat in Hungary. That is a fact.
What do you mean by the term “populism”?
Populism is when a politician blames others for all the sins, does nothing, and looks for enemies. It’s very easy—instead of carrying out reforms, making changes, or fighting corruption, to say that “they” are to blame for everything. You can substitute anyone for the word “they.” At first, Orbán substituted the word “Brussels,” then he substituted the word “Ukraine,” and he kept doing that all the time. That’s a populist. They can come in all shapes and sizes. There can be populists who say that all old-school politicians are the same, that we just need new ones and they’ll be better. You can blame external forces. You can blame everyone in sight, just like Trump loves to do. Blame Europe, blame anyone. That is, when a politician doesn’t act but looks for someone to blame. That is a typical form of populism. Populism itself can vary, divided into right-wing and left-wing, depending on who is being blamed. But the mechanism itself doesn’t change. Europe has recently been afflicted by this disease of populism. And look, all the populist movements in France and Germany were built on accusations: Brussels, the Brussels bureaucracy, migrants, anyone. That is populism. And populism has certainly been defeated in Hungary. But that doesn’t mean populism has disappeared. That’s why I don’t think this is a turning point. Populism remains in many European countries. This is a huge danger for France, for Germany. So to say that this is a turning point—probably not. But it is definitely a painful defeat. Because Orbán was a symbol of anti-European politics in Europe. If there were an award for anti-European politicians for anti-European policies, Orbán would constantly win prizes, or even take first place. And now this politician has left power. So this is a blow, but it is not a turning point. And, of course, a great deal here will depend on what happens in Hungary itself. If Hungary adopts a fundamentally different policy—one that is more responsible and pro-European—then we can say that, at the very least, there is a hint that Europe might be seeing a turning point in the fight against populism.
What was the key factor in Péter Magyar’s victory: the economy, corruption, fatigue with the government, or a demand for democracy?
I don’t think it’s a demand for democracy. I think it’s more about corruption and the economy. The main criticism leveled at Orbán was that he failed on the economic front.
If we look at the starting conditions 15–20 years ago in Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary’s neighbors, Hungary could have outpaced many of them, including Poland. But now it lags behind even Romania, not to mention Slovakia. Hungary is now economically behind its neighbors. The Orbán era has had a significant impact on the lives of ordinary Hungarians. Orbán, like any populist, began seeking solutions in international affairs. His ambassadors began meeting with Putin and accusing Zelenskyy. But Magyar did something else—he began meeting with Hungarians, specifically in small towns. He started talking about the fight against corruption, and that’s what won him those votes.
Is this a form of social protest or a conscious choice of democratic values and the future?
If these were democratic values, we would have seen something like the Maidan protests even during the election campaign under the slogans of the fight for democracy. If we recall Ukrainian history, for example, during the Yanukovych era, when democratic freedoms were being suppressed, the Maidan protests were formed precisely for the sake of freedom. We, on the other hand, didn’t have, for example, economic Maidan protests because our economy was bad. Ours were always for liberal values, for freedoms. And in Hungary, there were no problems with that; there were never any problems with going out and protesting. I don’t recall Orbán breaking up rallies. That’s why I don’t think democratic values were the main factor during the elections. I think it was the economy. I think that ordinary Hungarians, as they say, felt they were losing out badly due to corruption and economic backwardness. And Orbán was associated with this lag. Magyar came along and told them about it. He told them, “Look, this is your current economic situation because of this bureaucrat who prevents the economy from functioning properly, and around whom a corrupt bureaucracy has formed.” So he traveled all over Hungary and told them this. And it worked. That was the main theme of these elections. Orbán’s campaign was international; Magyar’s campaign was deeply Hungarian. Small towns, small villages. That’s what gave Magyar such a decisive victory.
Hungary is a member of the European Union. And it seemed that at least all members of the European Union should be more or less on a similar level, particularly in terms of the economy and the fight against corruption. But I understand that you’re saying Hungary remained relatively democratic during these 16 years of Orbán’s rule. But what about his efforts to somehow establish cooperation with Russia, to play into Russia’s hands? How does that even fit into the concept of European Union membership and democratic values? I mean, when Hungary joined the EU, it chose its own path. But the government, for example, started looking in a different direction.
Is that democratic or not? How do these concepts of democracy correlate with what has been happening in recent years?
Well, why go all the way to Hungary? Just look at Ukraine. Before the annexation of Crimea, before the war began, before 2014, a third of the population voted for pro-Russian parties. At least half the country believed that Russia was not our enemy. And they viewed normal relations with Russia as perfectly normal. And every prime minister or president would inevitably make their first visit to Moscow, bow or curtsy, and ask for cheap gas. Was Ukraine not a democratic country? Yes, of course it was democratic. Well, with its own nuances, but generally democratic. Because, in principle, this was accepted by the people who voted for those in power. Now Slovakia and Hungary are going through this same issue—this obsession with cheap Russian gas. Some countries are more aware, like Poland, while others are less so. And we see that it is very difficult for some European countries to completely break free from Russia’s influence. And what about Eastern and Central Europe? Look, in Germany, “Alternative for Germany,” which advocates lifting sanctions against Russia, is currently leading in the polls. And if you look at Germany’s electoral map, you can see that voting there follows the borders of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) very clearly. You’d think, “Germany.” It happens there too. And populism can emerge and have very strange consequences in many countries. Take the Netherlands, for example. I want to remind you that this is one of the countries that opposed Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. They even held a referendum on the matter, which passed. Well, but then the wise Dutch found a way to get around it. But a full-fledged referendum did take place. So, is the Netherlands not a democratic country? It’s very democratic indeed! That’s why pro-Russian sentiments are not a sign of a lack of democracy. That’s why I say that populism is the biggest problem for Europe. Populist movements actually advocate ties with Russia because populists need simple solutions. They are to blame, and to make this go away, something needs to be done. And no one is thinking a few steps ahead. That’s why I think that the Hungarian situation isn’t about a lack of democracy; it’s about a surge of populism that has set its development back by a decade. Now, I hope they will correct their mistake before it’s too late.
This populism and so-called “Orbanism”—to what extent can it be eradicated from political life, from all spheres of life in Hungary in the near future?
And besides, many call Péter Magyar, let’s say, a “light version” of Orbán. What do you think?
I think he will simply reflect Hungarian public sentiment. Orbán has already gone to extremes, while Magyar will be a moderate politician who takes a moderate stance toward Russia, Ukraine, and Europe.
Judging by what he says, he is not a supporter of Putin, but he says that we are interested in buying energy resources from Russia because our economy is in free fall. By the way, I don’t think Mádor will completely destroy Orbán as a political figure. On the contrary, for Magyar, Orbán will now be a very useful tool to play with, for example, in front of European officials. When Brussels demands certain, let’s say, economic reforms from Hungary—which could be painful—Magyar will say, “Do you want Orbán to come back?” That’s why I think Magyar will now showcase Orbán as much as possible and demonize him to the fullest extent, in order to make it easier to negotiate with the European Union. Well, for example, take the “Druzhba” oil pipeline. Magyar will now ask for the oil to keep flowing because it’s cheaper for the Hungarian economy—from an economic standpoint, not a political one. Not because Magyar has pro-Russian leanings; he simply believes it’s cheaper. And he’ll now start scaring people again with the prospect of Orbán’s return. If this isn’t done—and this includes talking about it not only to Europe but also to Ukraine—he’ll say, “Look, if you don’t support me now, there will be elections again, I’ll lose the next election, and you’ll have to deal with Orbán again.” That’s the story he’ll spin. And as for whether “Orbánism” can be completely eradicated, I don’t think so. I think populism is a very serious disease in general. Because, for example, you mention democracy. But, for example, it’s much easier to eradicate authoritarianism. Because with authoritarianism, everything is clear. If a leader is authoritarian, a dictator—well, it’s clear that he’s a dictator, that it’s evil. Look at Lukashenko, and everything is clear. Here’s Lukashenko, here’s the dictator, here’s good, here’s evil. But with populism, it’s more complicated. When a leader has a populist electorate, all those people who vote for him don’t even realize they’re sick. Populism is very difficult to identify for those people who are immersed in this populism. They vote. And when you don’t recognize your illness, it’s almost impossible to be cured. Or, at least, very difficult. That’s why populism is much harder to eradicate than authoritarianism. And that’s why I think this process will be very painful and difficult for Hungary. But I am still optimistic about Magyar for the simple reason that Magyar is just as dependent on European funds right now because of the economy. And he will seek a compromise with European officials so that Hungary receives funds and makes some economic progress. Because a person who ran an election campaign on economic slogans now needs economic assistance. The only entity that can provide him with this economic aid in this situation is the European Union. And, speaking of the economy, there’s also cheap Russian energy. This is the policy Magyar will now pursue. And, by the way, his first foreign visits prove that he is not a “light version” of Orbán. His first foreign visit to Poland is definitely not a sign of Orbán. And it is definitely not a pro-Russian policy. The second visit to Austria makes perfect sense to me. It’s Austria-Hungary; they are long-standing historical partners. By the way, Austria is a neutral country. And then the third visit to Brussels. Therefore, based on these visits, one can conclude that Magyar will likely not be a “light version” of Orbán. But I don’t think his position will be radically different either. He won’t be a pro-Ukrainian politician who, like Johnson, will be running around aimlessly. Johnson recently visited Ukraine. He will be a sort of moderate, conservative Eastern European politician in line with the general trend of Eastern European politics.
Can we expect the European Union’s financial aid for Hungary to be unblocked in the near future?
Yes, definitely. I have no doubt about it. Because the Europeans will make a direct demand to resume funding for Hungary so that he lifts this blockade. Here, I think, there won’t be any intrigue.
Regarding Russia. How, exactly, does this victory of Péter Magyar affect the Russian vector? That is, to what extent is this a defeat for Russia, a certain geopolitical blow? In other words, is Russia effectively losing an ally in the EU?
It is definitely a defeat. This defeat is very significant in terms of Russia’s overall ability to influence its neighbors. They’ve already lost several countries. Before this, they lost the Caucasus. They were driven out of there by the Turks and Azerbaijanis with Pakistan’s help, by the way. Because of Nagorno-Karabakh, they lost not only Azerbaijan but also Armenia, which has essentially shifted its geopolitical alignment in the opposite direction. In other words, they were pushed out of the Caucasus, and quite severely at that. They lost influence in the North because Finland is now a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. And closer to the events in Hungary. They lost Moldova through political maneuvering, and before that, they lost Romania. They are losing ground among the Balkan countries. Hungary was supposedly pro-Russian; they sent political strategists there, tried to pull off something in the Russian style—some provocations—but they’re losing. In other words, Russia is losing power in international politics. I’m not even talking about military or political power. This is an obvious defeat for Russia. A very clear defeat. True, it’s not just Russia. It’s very interesting who lost out because of Orbán’s defeat. Russia lost, the United States lost, and China lost. Orbán created a sort of alliance around himself. And now all these major players have lost spectacularly and shown that they don’t understand everything they should. In a way, Trump might even be forgiven for this defeat, given what he’s been doing. Basically, his support for Orbán isn’t exactly his finest hour.
But when it comes to Russia, it’s obvious. Because Russia had ambitions to work with Orbán. They did work together, and the Hungarian foreign minister often spent time in Moscow, and there were various trips there. That’s why this is such a striking defeat for Russia. Russia lost and demonstrated its inability to exert political influence on other countries. This is wonderful news for everyone.
Can the example of Hungary—the results of these elections, the democratic elections in the Hungarian parliament—serve as a model for other countries regarding such a democratic return to Europe?
Fortunately, only one country gives grounds to believe that a retreat from Europe might occur there. That is Slovakia. But still, Slovakia, it seems to me, is a different story. Because this is the personal story of Robert Fico, who, for some personal reasons, perhaps, does not like Ukraine. There are no electoral grounds for this in Slovakia. By the way, just as there were none in Hungary, as the elections showed. And, by the way, pollsters also said that even when Orbán was in power a year ago, the majority of Hungarians believed that Ukraine should be supported. It’s a paradox. The same is true in Slovakia, by the way, right now. And I think that Fico, by the way, right now—if you look at the polls—and his coalition, if elections were held today, wouldn’t even form. They’re losing votes there. Therefore, even in Slovakia, one can say that such a large-scale shift away from Europe hasn’t been observed yet. I think this could certainly serve as an example of how anti-European policies ultimately lead to defeat. Especially for those countries that cannot rely on other centers of influence, either economically or politically. Just look: neither Trump, nor Putin, nor China helped Orbán. No one helped him. And I think this should serve as an example for Eastern and Central Europe. The point is that there is simply no alternative to integration into the European Union. Even if you brazenly play games with it. Even if the entire U.S. vice president flies in to see you, it won’t help you. We must work with Europe. I think this should serve as a good example of how the European Union, despite all its colossal problems, remains a rather unique entity that gives the countries of Eastern and Central Europe a chance to develop and, through that, a chance to become influential countries in the world and part of Europe.
Author: Svitlana Myalik
