Irreversible Loss of Armenia: Can Yerevan Turn Its Back on the Kremlin

Forty-eight heads of government and state in Yerevan. A historic event for Armenia and yet another blow to Russia’s self-image. On May 4, the capital of Armenia hosted the “Armenia-EU” European Political Community summit, which was notable not only for the country’s rapprochement with the European Union but also for the visit of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Olena Bordilovska, head of the New Challenges Department at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, spoke to “Black Sky” about the specifics and reasons behind Yerevan’s distancing from Moscow.

In brief:

  • The process of Armenia’s distancing from Russia began after Moscow refused to provide military support during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
  • Armenia has “frozen” its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), though it officially remains a member.
  • Armenia passed a law to begin the process of joining the EU.
  • In early April, the Prime Minister of Armenia met with the President of Russia. A number of sensitive issues were raised.
  • The “Armenia-EU” summit took place on May 4 in Yerevan. Forty-eight heads of government visited Armenia, including the President of Ukraine.
  • Russia reacted sharply to the summit in Yerevan and summoned the Armenian ambassador to express its dissatisfaction with Zelenskyy’s visit.

What prompted Armenia to change course?

Armenia was considered an ally of Russia, particularly due to the signing in 1992 of the Collective Security Treaty, which was granted the status of an international regional organization in 2002. The CSTO still includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. However, in 2024, Armenia effectively suspended its participation in the military-political alliance.

The head of the New Challenges Department at the NISS, Olena Bordilovska, explains that the rift in relations between Armenia and Russia began with the latter’s refusal to provide military assistance during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, which broke out in 2020.

“The main reason was the Second Karabakh War. And, in fact, the fact that Russia left Armenia without the assistance it had counted on. Prime Minister Pashinyan spoke openly about this in 2022–2023.

Armenia was abandoned; no assistance was provided during the war with Azerbaijan, and he won that war not only with Turkey’s help but also because no one helped Armenia, including Moscow.”

The Karabakh conflict was successfully resolved without Moscow’s assistance, through diplomatic channels. On January 8, 2025, a peace agreement was signed between Yerevan and Baku, under the terms of which each country would retain its own territory and have no territorial claims against one another. The territories of Nagorno-Karabakh were ceded to Azerbaijan, the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was dissolved (on January 1, 2024, following Azerbaijan’s military operation), and Armenia faced a wave of refugees. Therefore, Armenia effectively lost this war, which prompted the search for new security guarantors.

In 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan officially confirmed Armenia’s intention to leave the CSTO.

“As early as 2023, Armenian leaders made very strong statements that Armenia saw no point at all in remaining an active member of the CSTO. And the summit held in Yerevan took place without the signing of the relevant documents or declarations. Armenia refused to participate in joint exercises. And it effectively ceased its participation in CSTO activities, although it has not yet officially withdrawn from it,” says Olena Bordilovska.

Following statements about its intention to leave the organization, Yerevan ceased its participation in funding its activities and secured the partial withdrawal of Russian military and border guards from Armenia.

A Course Toward Europe

Following disappointment with the military-political alliance, which was supposed to guarantee security and military support for the country, a law on the start of the country’s accession to the EU was signed in April 2025.

“The European Union welcomed the start of Armenia’s journey, but no official steps have been taken, meaning this has not yet had any impact. Armenia is not a candidate for accession; there is no association or association agreement with the European Union, but there are significant steps indicating that Armenia sees its future there, and not at all with Moscow,” notes Olena Bordilovska.

The bill was initiated by the extra-parliamentary civic initiative “Platform of Democratic Forces,” which in the fall of 2024 collected over 60,000 signatures in support of holding a referendum on European integration in Armenia.

The head of the New Challenges Department at the NISS Olena Bordilovska, believes that Armenia has a better chance of joining the EU in the coming years than Ukraine:

“I think there is hope, but no one can say when exactly. On the other hand, I would say that Armenia may have a better chance than Ukraine of doing so sooner. It is a small country with a small economy and a small population that poses no competition to the European Union.”

One of the historic events for Armenia was the European Political Community summit, which took place in Yerevan on April 4, 2026. The country hosted 48 heads of government and state, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus (the democratic government-in-exile).

Yerevan’s Position on the Ukrainian-Russian War

From the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Armenia stated that it did not support Russia in this war, but no concrete actions followed. In September 2023, the wife of the Prime Minister of Armenia, Anna Hakobyan, visited Kyiv and brought with her the country’s first humanitarian aid in the form of devices for online education for Ukrainian children.

In early 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that the country is not an ally of Russia in the war with Ukraine, but noted that Armenia’s cooperation with other countries is not directed against Russia:

“When the war in Ukraine first began, I gave an interview to CNN and said that we are not Russia’s allies on the issue of Ukraine. And that is the reality. But I also want to say that our security cooperation with the U.S., France, or our other partners is not directed against another of our security partners…”, the prime minister said, as reported by Ukrinform.

On May 7, 2026, in Yerevan, it was once again emphasized that Armenia is not an ally of Russia in the war with Ukraine.

“The biggest thorn in Moscow’s side is President Zelenskyy’s participation in the EU summit held in early May. This is a very successful event for Armenia, and for Pashinyan himself on the eve of the elections, among other things,” adds Olena Bordilovska.

The head of the New Challenges Department at the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) believes that Zelenskyy’s visit to Armenia signaled Ukraine’s support for the peace agreements between Yerevan and Baku. This was the first meeting between the Ukrainian president and the Armenian prime minister, and it took place just a few days after a visit to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

“Azerbaijan is a strategic ally of Ukraine, and, in principle, Ukraine has not been neutral in recent years but has supported the Azerbaijani side, which to some extent has significantly strained Ukrainian relations with Armenia. I believe that a very clear line of Ukraine’s foreign policy is now being drawn, demonstrating that Kyiv, first and foremost, wholeheartedly welcomes reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” – says Olena Bordilovska.

What levers of influence does Russia have left?

Moscow had two immediate reasons for outrage regarding the EU summit in Yerevan. First and foremost is the summit’s very significance, which points to a rapprochement between the Kremlin’s former ally and the West.

Putin reminded the current prime minister that in Ukraine “it all began” with an attempt to join the EU, and recalled the events of the “Revolution of Dignity” in Ukraine, calling it a coup d’état, as well as the loss of Crimea.

On the other hand, Zelenskyy’s visit to Yerevan provoked a sharp reaction. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Armenian ambassador to express the unacceptability of providing the Ukrainian leader with a “platform” to voice “terrorist threats against Russia” and emphasized their outrage over the lack of a negative assessment of Zelenskyy’s speech from official Yerevan.

Despite losing its military influence over Yerevan, Russia still retains economic and energy levers of influence.

“In early April, Pashinyan made a rather unexpected visit to Moscow. And, by all accounts, it was quite tense. In particular, Pashinyan raised several important issues. The Yerevan railway is under concession to Russian companies engaged in rail transport, and he specifically raised the issue of returning the railway to the custody, so to speak, of the Armenian side. He also mentioned that Armenia intends to review its energy policy; in particular, the Russian company “Energoatom” holds a very strong position in Armenia,” says Olena Bordilovska.

The head of the New Challenges Department at the NISS explains that during this meeting, Putin emphasized to Pashinyan that Yerevan must make a decision, as pursuing both European integration and participation in the Eurasian Economic Union—of which Armenia is also a member—is impossible. To which Pashinyan replied that only the Armenian people would decide which path to take, and emphasized the possibility of holding a referendum if necessary.

Yulia Derdyuk

Official Russian and Belarusian sources cited in this text are for informational purposes only. Content from these sources may constitute disinformation or propaganda.

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