The elections to the Czech Senate have shown that the populism factor is gradually beginning to work against the populists themselves
Amid the unrelieved gloom of negative news in recent weeks, caused by the behind-the-scenes intrigues of the negotiations between Trump’s emissaries and the Kremlin cannibal, by thuggish pogroms carried out by Islamist “titushky” in a number of European countries and by new anti-Ukrainian statements from our neighbours, a bright ray of optimism and of hope for a return to better times has finally flashed – the outcome of the mid-term elections to the Senate of the Czech Republic.
In these elections, held in two rounds on 10 and 17 October, the parties of the governing and clearly not pro-Ukrainian coalition of populists did not win a single one of the 27 seats available! On top of that, the far-right SPD party of Speaker Tomio Okamura also suffered a complete flop in the local elections.
We asked the political scientist Nadiia Kichera, associate professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of Uzhhorod University, to analyse the results of the elections in the Czech Republic.
In brief
- This year’s mid-term elections to the Czech Senate were a tangible political setback for the populist party of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš
- The results of the local elections confirmed a trend of declining grassroots support for the incumbent Prime Minister’s party
- The “Ukrainian question” remains an important marker of political division in the Czech Republic
Ms Kichera, what short phrase best sums up the results of the recent elections in the Czech Republic?
In my view, the most apt description of how catastrophic the governing coalition’s result was in this year’s Czech Senate elections came from Prime Minister Andrej Babiš himself: “We are the strongest party in the whole country, except for the Senate.” This phrase is a veiled admission of defeat by the Prime Minister’s own party.
And indeed, the Senate elections that have just taken place were a tangible political setback for the ANO movement (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens), led by Andrej Babiš himself. The Prime Minister’s political force did not win a single seat in the second round of the elections to the upper chamber of parliament. What is more, it also lost the only Senate seat it was defending in these elections. The Prime Minister himself is shifting the blame for the defeat onto the regional branches, so the party is in for a serious audit.
Please tell us in more detail about the results of the elections. Which political forces have lost voters’ trust, and which have gained it?
This year, 27 of the 81 senators in the upper chamber of parliament were up for re-election. That is one third of the senators. The lower Chamber of Deputies has greater powers, since the Czech constitutional system is built with a considerable imbalance of power in favour of the lower chamber. However, the Senate is an important institution of checks and balances, a kind of democratic lever and a particular indicator of voters’ moods, given that one third of the senators are re-elected every two years.
Nor should the upper chamber of parliament be underestimated, given that it can under no circumstances be dissolved, and if the President dissolves the lower chamber, the Senate takes over its urgent powers. In addition, the Senate’s role is no less important when the constitution is amended and important international agreements are ratified. But in the context of elections, it is precisely the frequency of the re-election procedure that can be an important indicator of voters’ moods.
So, after ANO’s return to power in 2025, voters had the opportunity to judge it on its practical decisions, and the Senate elections produced the following results, which are set out in the comparative table:
| Political force | Seats won in 2026 | Seats won in 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Mayors and Independents (STAN) and regional allies | 10 | 5 |
| Civic Democratic Party (ODS) | 7 | 5 |
| Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) | 3 | 2 |
| TOP 09 | 2 | 2 |
| Other parties and local groupings | 5 | 5 |
| ANO movement | 0 | 8 |
Thus ANO retained the ability to win seats in Senate elections, but obtained 0 of the 27 seats at stake and lost the only Senate seat it held among those up for re-election.
In the first round, Senate seats were won by two opposition politicians – Jan Grolich (KDU-ČSL – Christian Democratic Union) and Jan Grulich of TOP 09 (Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita 09 – a liberal-conservative, democratic centre-right Czech party). In the second round, none of the ANO candidates got through.
Even more telling is the fact that the ANO candidates were not linked to scandals or corruption cases, nor were they known for extremist or radical views. In other words, what may have played a role in this case was their affiliation with a political force that has probably lost some of its appeal among voters. Moreover, turnout in the second round was low, which indicates that it was precisely the politically conscious part of the citizenry that took part.
Local elections were held at the same time as the Senate elections. What were their results?
As for the local elections, their result is not as dismal for the incumbent Prime Minister’s party, but the downward trend in support is obvious. According to the statistics, ANO’s share of the vote in the local elections was 14.3%, compared with 16.6% in 2022, and the number of ANO local councillors elected fell from 1,748 in 2022 to 1,650 in 2026. As for the regional capitals, ANO won 6 of the 13 seats there, compared with a ratio of 8 to 13 in 2022.
However, the most noticeable gap in support in the local elections is seen in the results of political forces such as the Social Democrats (SOCDEM), the Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) and the “Czech Pirates” (Piráti). Here it is worth noting their insignificant representation overall compared with parties such as KDU-ČSL (Christian Democrats), ODS (Civic Democratic Party) and STAN (Mayors and Independents); the decline in the latter’s results is also one of the lowest, only 2.4% compared with 2022.
Tellingly, the only increase in the 2026 elections was shown by independent candidates and local associations – plus almost 5% of seats, although their representation had already numbered several tens of thousands before. Thus the recognisability and positive image of independent local candidates played a role here.
What conclusions can be drawn from the election results, and what trends in Czechs’ political moods did they capture?
The 2026 mid-term elections in the Czech Republic can be interpreted as a signal that ANO’s position in local politics is weakening and that it faces more serious difficulties in Senate elections. A combination of reasons played a role here, but one should not claim that any one of them was decisive, although taken together they may have had a negative impact on the parties’ reputation and ratings.
First of all, it is worth mentioning the specific features of the Czech electoral system, since senators are elected in single-member constituencies. Consequently, a party may enjoy support nationwide but lose in various constituencies that have strong local candidates of their own. As regards the ANO movement, the populism factor should not be dismissed either: having come to power, the party could no longer blame its failures on someone else, and some voters may have perceived its loud statements as insufficiently backed up by the results of its work, which caused disappointment among some supporters of this political force.
Another factor may have been economic discontent: the rising cost of living in a broader sense, energy prices, transport costs, the purchasing power of the population and so on.
Personal factors may also have had a noticeable effect on ratings and results, in particular the fact that the Prime Minister’s own political career has long been accompanied by disputes over conflicts of interest and his business activities, plus scandals involving his partners.
Czech media also pointed out that the constant provocations and controversies surrounding F. Turek, the Andrej Babiš government’s commissioner for climate policy and the “Green Deal”, may have put off some voters. It is worth recalling that after the parliamentary elections in October 2025, F. Turek sought the post of foreign minister, and then that of environment minister, as a party nominee in Andrej Babiš’s newly formed government, but President Petr Pavel refused to appoint F. Turek because of his controversial statements and racist or homophobic posts on social media.
The latter fact may point to yet another, separate factor that negatively influenced voters – the government’s systemic conflicts with Czech President Petr Pavel. So the mobilisation of voters who support the President or oppose increasing influence over other institutions may have played a role here.
Attitudes towards the Ukrainian-Russian war, Ukrainian refugees and Ukraine in general are a certain political watershed in the electoral moods of most European countries, including the Czech Republic. How did this issue affect the election results?
In fact, without polling voters it is practically impossible to establish reliably what exactly motivated them to make one choice or another, including what share of the vote was driven by attitudes towards Ukraine and Ukrainians.
The “Ukrainian question” remains an important marker of political division in the Czech Republic, but it is not the only explanation of electoral behaviour. The election results should be viewed in a broad context – as an assessment of the performance of the Prime Minister, his government and its political course. One should not draw unequivocal conclusions that anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, or rhetoric sceptical of aid to Ukraine, in itself guarantees electoral success, or that voters voted for the opposition precisely because of its support for Ukraine. The foreign policy orientation of the new government as a whole may also have come into play here, and thus not only the question of support for Ukraine but also particular approaches to the European Union. One can therefore assume a risk, and hence a likelihood, that ANO supporters who back a pragmatic pro-European course and/or aid to Ukraine may have assessed cooperation with Eurosceptic partners more critically.
Interview by Vasyl Ilnytskyi
