The expansion of the European Union to include post-Soviet states is one of the greatest challenges facing Vladimir Putin. This process significantly reduces Russia’s sphere of direct influence. And so the Kremlin will actively oppose the European integration of Ukraine and Moldova, despite public assurances that it sees no problem with it.
In brief:
- Ukraine and Moldova have opened a key cluster of EU accession negotiations—“Fundamentals”—but the path to membership is only just beginning.
- The European integration of post-Soviet states reduces Russia’s influence, so the Kremlin has an interest in slowing down this process.
- Among the main tools of influence are information campaigns, highlighting corruption, speculating on values, and fueling skepticism toward the EU.
- Russia may exploit the internal problems of Ukraine and Moldova, as well as promote narratives about a “crisis in Europe” and the futility of accession.
- The success of European integration will depend not only on the EU’s political will, but also on the ability of Ukraine and Moldova to implement reforms and defend their own interests.
On June 15, during an intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg, a decision was made to open the “Fundamentals” cluster in the negotiation process between the European Union and Ukraine and Moldova. This cluster is rightly considered key to the process of European integration; the negotiation process begins with its opening and concludes with it. Incidentally, the European Council failed to adopt a decision to open the five other negotiation clusters, as had been hoped for in Kyiv and Chisinau. This is a rather alarming signal.
Compliance with the requirements of the “Fundamentals” cluster can be seen as a test of a candidate country’s readiness to conduct domestic policy in accordance with the principles of the European Union. The fight against corruption, ensuring transparency in public procurement, and respecting the rights of minorities—these principles of the EU’s functioning create a unified space of meaning and values. That is why the “Fundamentals” cluster is opened first and closed last in the negotiation process. At the same time, I would like to note that to monitor the progress of the negotiation process, the European Union has established several dozen benchmarks designed to help oversee the process of European integration for post-Soviet countries.
However, we must not forget that the Kremlin views the rapprochement of post-Soviet countries with the European Union as a geopolitical challenge. Therefore, they will do everything possible to complicate this process, the duration of which remains undetermined. There is reason to believe that Russian propaganda will devote considerable resources to exaggerating existing problems. Let’s highlight the main tools so that it is easier to counter them.
Exaggerating existing problems.
Although support for the prospect of EU accession in Ukraine and Moldova is quite high, we must not forget the existing challenges along this path. The Russian-Ukrainian war is a recognized trigger for a number of EU countries, and the existence of the self-proclaimed Transnistria negatively affects perceptions of Moldova’s chances of joining the EU. A common negative factor that can be exploited is large-scale corruption (“Mindichgate” and the “Billion-Euro Scandal” are the most striking, though not the only, examples—ed.). Kremlin propagandists will have ample opportunities for information manipulation.
Downplaying candidate status.
A realistic perception of the path to European integration is not a strong suit of the Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities. Russia has a pool of political émigrés from both countries who are ready to sing anti-European songs according to the Kremlin’s script. In fact, the willingness to collaborate with the Kremlin is one of the biggest problems facing post-Soviet countries. That is precisely why it is necessary to launch information campaigns on European integration today—without rose-colored glasses.
Speculation on Values.
At the highest political level, Russia allows itself to use the term “Gayrope,” emphasizing its rejection of basic European values through their artificial sexualization. The Orthodox churches that remain under the authority of Moscow Patriarch Kirill (Gundyayev) will serve as the Kremlin’s agents of influence in Ukraine and Moldova. Given the conservative nature of both societies, we can expect active grassroots opposition to the political establishment’s pursuit of European integration in Moldova and Ukraine.
Apocalyptic predictions.
Significant turbulence in international relations provides the Kremlin with arguments for predicting the “inevitable collapse” of the European Union. In reality, given its size and the number of citizens united within the EU, the Union appears quite active, as evidenced by the well-known fact that it was the EU institutions themselves that, at the outset of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, demonstrated their readiness to support the European integration of Moldova and Ukraine (the third member of the Association Trio—Georgia—voluntarily suspended its European integration efforts—ed.). Despite the assurances of Kremlin propagandists, the European Union is an alternative to existing and defunct empires, and this should not be forgotten.
The hype surrounding decoupling.
Ukraine and Moldova are one of the largest and one of the smallest countries in Europe. Frankly speaking, their levels of readiness for European integration differ. Moldova benefits from the absence of hostilities on its territory and the support of Romania, which completed its EU accession process nearly 20 years ago. Decoupling—the possible collapse of the post-Soviet European integration tandem—should not be dramatized, but rather viewed as a working hypothesis.
European integration is a complex process that must be discussed in terms of practical steps. We should neither downplay nor exaggerate this process, but we should define a pragmatic set of “must-haves” for our national interests. The speed and effectiveness of European integration depend to a large extent on our ability to protect these interests on the path to the European Union we aspire to join.
Author: Svitlana Myalik
